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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment concerning the status I 
of a judgment lien which existed prior to the date that defend<~ 
Leoda Dunham lwho is the judgment debtor) declared her interest: 
in the subject real estate to be her home stead, and prior to 
the date that said defendant Leoda Di.mham conveyed her interest[ 
in the homestead property, reserving a life estate, to responde:~ 
I 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On August 1, 1977, a hearing before the court below was 
held relative to respondents' Motion For Judgment On The Plead1:j 
Or For SUI!Uilary Judgment, and relative to appellant'-s cross-rnotiq 
for Judgment On The Pleadings Or For Surmnary Judgment. In 
response thereto, the court below rendered it's judgment 
adjuding that the conveyance of property subj ec t to a home stead, 
with the reservation of a life estate in defendant Leoda 
Dunham (gran tor) , did not re serve the home stead in the said 
granter, but that such homestead was conveyed to the grantees, 
respondents herein, and that the value of the conveyed interest 
at that time was less than that of the homestead interest. 
I 
I 
On that basis, the court granted respondents' Motion For Judgmer: 
On The Pleadings and denied appellant's motion. The judgment 
was entered on September 6, 1977, and appellant made 11is Motion 
To Reconsider And To Amend Findings Of Fact within ten days 
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thereafter. 
On October 3rd, 1977, the court :1eard appellant's Motion 
To Reconsider And To Arrend Findings Of Fact. Thereafter, the 
court rendered its order denying appellant's motion, which 
order was entered on October 17th, 1977. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a ruling by this court to the effect that 
appellant's prior judgment lien was superior to defendant Leoda 
Dunham's subsequent homestead claim, and that, consequently, 
the interest acquired by repondents from defendant Leoda Dunham, 
even if it included defendant Leoda Dunham's homestead, was 
subject to appellant 1 s prior judgment lien; or 
In the alternative, appellant seeks a ruling by this 
court that defendant Leoda Dunham did not convey her homestead 
to repondents, and that, consequently, the interest acquired 
by respondents was subject to appellant's prior judgment lien; 
or 
In the event this court affirms part of the judgment of 
the lower court by not reversing the lower court' s judgment 
so as to conform with the legal propositions of the immediately 
preceeding two paragraphs, then appellant seeks a ruling re-
quiring the lower court to determine at trial the value of the 
real estate interest conveyed to respondents by defendant 
Leoda Dunham; and 
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Appellant seeks an order from this court authorizing and 
requiring the oourt below to amend it's Findings of Fact to 
include all the allegations in the parties' pleadings which we 
adroi tted; and 
Appellant seeks an order from this court authorizing and 
requiring the oourt below to amend it's Findings of Fact to ini 
porate the changes set forth in paragraphs four and five of 
appellant's Statement of Points Relied On. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(Reference to appellant's Counterclaim, which is a part o 
appellant's Answer To Amended Complaint, Counterclaim And Cros: 
complaint, is hereinafter referred to as "CC"; reference to 
respondents' Reply to appellant's counterclaim is hereinafter 
referred to as "R") . 
On or about the 17th day of May, 1971, appellant obtained 
a judgment against the defendant Leoda Dunham in the 
principal sum of $11,549.43, together with costs of suit. 
lRespondents' Amended Complaint, First Cause of Action, para. 
S; appellant's Answer To Am::!nded Complaint, Counterclaim, And 
Cross-complaint, Second Defense, para 1. J 
On or about the 1st day of August, 1972, appellant caused 
to be issued out of the office of the clerk of Summit County, 
an execution, whereby and wherein the sheriff of Summit county 
was directed to execute and levy upon the property of defendant 
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Leoda Dunham. Thereafter, the Sheriff of Sununit County 
caused to be posted a Notice of Sale, whereby and where in the 
property that is the subject r:ia.tter of this action was noticed 
for sale at the county courthouse in Summit County, State of 
Utah, on the 13th day of September, 1972 at the hour of 1: 00 
p.m. (CC, para 5; R, para. LA.). The Sheriff's Sale did 
not occur. 
On or ab~~\e.1J1e 10th day of September, 1972, defendant 
Leoda Dunham ~ a Declaration of Honestead asserting 
a homestead claim and exemption in the amount of $4,600.00 
for herself and her brother, and asserting that the value of 
the real estate subject to the homestead declaration, which is 
the subject property in this matter, was $3,600.00. Said 
Declaration of Homestead was recorded on the 11th day of 
September, 1972, in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
CCC para. 6; R, para. l.A.; and Declaration of Homestead 
attached to respondents' Amended Complaint.) 
On or about the 29th day of November, 1972, the defendant 
Leoda Dunham, as granter, conveyed by quit-claim deed 
to respondents the subject property, reserving to herself 
a life estate representing her homestead claim to the property. 
(CC, para. 7; R, para. LA.) 
Respondents, in consideration of the conveyance to 
them of cefendant Leoda Dunham's remainder interest, agreed to 
pay off cefendant Leoda Dunham's mortgage against the property 
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in the approximate amount of $2,000.00, and to acquire the 
appellant's interest. Appellant's interest in the property 
was a judgment, plus interest thereon, in the total approximate 
amount of $13,000.00. (See Agreement attached to either respon, 
l 
Affidavit which were submitted with respondents Motion For Jua1 
rrent On The Pleadings Or For Summary Judgment.) 
Respondents took the subject property knowing that appella) 
I 
had an unsatisfied judgment against defendant Leoda Dunham. 
(CC, para. 8; R, para. l.A.) 
On or about the 11th day of November, 1976, appellant 
caused to be issued through the office of the clerk of 
Summit County, an execution, whereby and wherein the sheriff 
of Summit County was commanded to execute and levy upon the 
unexempt personal and real property of the defendant Leoda 
Dunham, in an amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment 
dated May 17th, 1971, together with accrued interest thereon. 
(_CC, para. 9; R, para. l.A.) 
Instructions in the form of a Praecipe were issued to 
the sheriff of Summit County to sell an undivided one-half 
interest in the subject property. CCC, para. 10; R, para. 1.A .. I 
The Execution and Praecipe were served upon the re_spondent: 
by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. (CC, para. 11; R, panl 
l.A.) 
A sheriff's sale was held on December 7th, 1976, where-
at the appellant bid in the entire amount of his judgment for 
the subject property believing that he was purchasing the 
interest of defendant Leoda Dunham and that of respondents. 
(_CC, para. 13; R, para. 1. C.) 
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On or about the 21st day of April, 197"/, respondents filed 
suit against appellant and others, seeking declaratory relief 
and a judgrrent quieting title in the sub]ect property in them. 
It is out of this suit that this matter cones before this court. 
(Respondents' complaint). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT LEODA 
DUNHAM CREATED A LIEN ON THE IAND OF DEFENDANT 
LEODA ruNHAM WHICH WAS PRIOR 'ID AND SUPERIOR 
TO THE HOMESTEAD CLAIM OF DEFENDANT LEODA 
DUNHAM AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE ACQUISITION OF 
THE HOMESTEAD INTEREST BY RESPONDENTS FROM 
DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM, IF SUCH OCCURRED, DID 
NOT RESULT IN THE ACQUISITION OF AN INTEREST 
IN THE PROPERTY FREE FROM THE JUDGMENT LIEN. 
A judgment lien on real estate, obtained before a homestead 
is established thereon, is superior to, and not extinguished 
by, the homestead claim. Consequently, where a homestead 
declarant conveys real estate together with a homestead, where 
such homestead is subordinate to a judgment lien, the transferee 
receives the realty subject to the judgment lien, and that 
lien may be foreclosed against the property regardless of the 
fact that the homestead claimant may have transferred his home-
stead interest to the transferee. 
u.c.A. 28-1-1 provides that a home?tead "shall be exempt 
from judgment lien and from execution or forced sale" except 
upon certain conditions. None of the o::mditions apply to the 
instant case. Though this section has been amended to increase 
the exempt amounts and to add a condition, it's language is 
otherwise identical to the original provision as enacted in 
1898. (See "History" and "Compilers Notes" regarding U.C.A 
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28-1-11. 
U.C.A. 28-1-1 precludes execution and forced sale pursuant 
to a Judgment lien only when a homestead exists at the time a 
judgment lien would otherwise attach to the property. McMurdie, 
vs • Chugg , 10 7 P. 2 d 16 3 (Ytah 1940}; and U.C.A. 78-23-3. 
i 
In I 
McMurdie the court reaffirmed a position it had taken previous! 
with the following language : 
"Existing liens on property cannot be defeated 
by subsequently claiming said property as a Home-
stead." Page 166. 
U.C.A. 78-23-3 provides: 
"No article or species of property rrentioned in 
this chapter or in the title Homestead is exempt 
from execution issued upon a judgment .•• on fore-
closure of a mortgage or other val id lien ..• " 
(Emphasis added.) 
A judgment creates a lien on the judgment debtor's realty 
under the provisions of U.C.A. 78-22-1. A judgment lien 
cannot attach to homestead property unless otherwise provided 
in U.C.A. 28-1-1. Thus, unless otherwise provided in u.c.A. 
28-1-1, a judgment lien can be a "valid lien'' on a judgment 
debtor's real estate only if the real estate is not homestead 
property at the time the judgment is entered. Therefore, a 
judgment docketed before a homestead is declared, creating a 
judgment lien which is a valid lien under the provisions of 
U.C.A. 78-23-3, is not affected by· a subsequent homestead 
declaration. Thus, McMurdie and U.C.A. 78-23-3 demonstrate thac 
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the past .r_:osition of this court, and of the legislature, is that 
a Judgment lien attaching to realty before a home stead exists 
thereon does not lose any of it's force and effect upon the 
subsequent establishment of a homestead. Also, it should be 
noted that Utah is not alone in this position. Schuler-Knox 
Co. vs. Smith, 144 P.2d 47 LCalif. 1944). 
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of 
the instant case mandates the conclusion that the respondents 
are in no position to successfully maintain that the homestead 
of defendant I..eoda Dunham in any way affected the appellant's 
judgment lien, nor are they in a position to successfully claim 
that the sheriff's sale of the subject property did not transfer 
respondents' entire interest in the subject property to the 
purchaser, subject to rights of redemption. The pertinent 
facts are as follows: 
Appellant obtained a judgment against defendant Leoda 
Dunham in May, 1971. Proceedings for a sheriff's sale of 
defendant Leoda Dunham's property, which is the property in 
question here, were begun on or about August 1, 1972, but 
the sale was not consummated. On September 10th, 1972, defendant 
,,gn<0 
Leoda Dunham fi.J,ed a <Eclaration claiming her interests in the 
subject property to be a homestead. Thereafter, on or about 
November 29th, 1972, defendant Leoda Dunham conveyed the subject 
property to respondents, reserving a life estate in herself. 
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On or about November llth, 1976, appellant began sheriff 
sale proceedings which culminated December 7th, 1976, in a 
sheriff's sale of defendant Leoda Dunham's life estate and 
of respondents' remainder interest. Respondents thereafter 
in this action contested appellant's claim that their interest 1 
in the subject property had been sold at the sheriff's sale. 
The appellant's judgment of May 17th, 1971, became a lien 
i 
upon the realty of defendant Leoda Dunham which was not extingu1 
by her later homestead declaration. Defendant Leoda Dunham's 
conveyance of the remainder interest to respondents carried 
with it the judgment lien irrespective of whether defendant 
Leoda Dunham retained her homestead by reserving a life estate,. 
or transferred it to the respondents with the remainder 
I 
interest. Thus, the sheriff's sale was sufficient to foreclose 
the lien against respondents' interest in the property, and 
the sheriff sale purchaser, being the appellant herein, 
obtained title to the realty, subject to any rights of redemptu
1 
Consequently, respondents' claim that their interest in the 
subject realty was not sold, or was improperly sold at the 
sheriff's sale is unfounded. 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II 
THE CONVEYANCE FROM DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM TO 
RESPONDENTS, WHEREIN DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM 
RETAINED A LIFE ESTATE, DID NOT CONVEY DEFENDANT 
LEODA DUNHAM'S HOMESTEAD IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
TO RESPONDENTS. 
In the event this court for any reason does not hold 
that appellant's prior judgment lien was superior to defendant 
Leoda Dunham's homestead claim, such that respondents took 
a remainder interest from defendant Leoda Dlll"l.ham subject to 
it, then appellant submits the following argument. 
Other than the pleadings filed by the parties in this 
matter, there was little evidence brought before the court 
below upon which it could base it's ruling in this matter. 
Appellant alleged in paragraph 7 of it's counterclaim that the 
act of defendant Leoda Dunham in reserving a life estate in 
the subject property was an act whereby she retained her home-
stead. Respondents admitted that this was the case in their 
Reply to Appellant's counterclaim. See paragraph 1. A. of 
Respondents Reply. Though this admission was pointed out to 
the court below, the court ignored it. Further, respondents 
have never attempted to amend their Reply. This admission, 
by itself, should have precluded the court below from rendering 
·a judgment on the pleadings, and in any case, it should prohibit 
the respondents herein from taking a position contrary to this 
admission. 
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Aside from respondents' admission, it is evident that 
defendant Leoda Dunham did not convey her homestead in the 
subject property. 
In analyzing the facts from a position which rrost favors 
appellant, Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 266 
(!Jtah 1962 l, one rrust assume that defendant Leoda Dunham 
acted rationally in conveying her interests in the subject 
property to respondents. This assumption leads directly to 
the conclusion that defendant Leoda Dunham did not convey 
her homestead to respondents with the a:mveyance of the 
remainder interest in the property. This conclusion becomes 
very apparent upon analyzing the facts of this case. 
The pertinent facts are that defendant Leoda Dunham stated 
in her homestead declaration that the value of the property 
was $3,600.00 (which amount appellant disputes), and that 
she was entitled to a $4,600.00 exemption. Approximately 
three rronths later she sold her interest, reserving a life 
estate, for the respondents' promises that they would pay off 
a $2,000.00 rrortgage and "acquire" appellant's interest in 
defendant Leoda Dunham's property. (See Agreement attached to 
either respondents' Affidavit which was submitted with responden; 
Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or For Summary Judgment, 
-14-
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and Defendant's Exhibit No. 1.) Assuming that the value 
of defendant Leoda Dunham's undivided one-half interest 
was $3, 600. 00 as claimed, and that the full value was protected 
by a homestead claim in the amount of $4, 600. 00, the following 
results could have been obtained: 
Situation 
1. Defendant Leoda Dunham 
retained her entire interest 
instead of conveying a remainder 
interest therein to respondents. 
2. Defendant Leoda Dunham con-
veyed a remainder interest in the 
subject property to respondents 
together with her homestead 
and reserved a life estate. 
Respondents were to pay the rrort-
gage. (This is respondents' posi-
tion herein.) 
3. Defendant Leoda Dunham 
conveyed a remainder interest 
in the subject property to 
respondents, reserving a life 
estate. The reserved life estate 
carried the homestead. Respon-
dents agreed to pay off the 
$2,000.00 mortgage. (This is 
appellant's position.) 
Result to defendant Leoda Dunham 
Defendant Leoda Dunham v,10uld 
have an equity interest of 
~1,600.00 free and clear over 
the $2,000.00 mortgage. 
Defendant Leoda Dunham would 
be free of the ~2, 000. 00 
mortgage , but she would have an 
unprotected life estate which 
could be taken from her upon 
foreclosure of the judgment 
lien. 
Defendant Leoda Dunham would be 
free of the $2,000.00 mortgage 
and she would have a protected 
life estate. 
Clearly, defendant Leoda Dunham would have chosen situation 
No. 3 over situation No. 2. 
In addition to the assumption that defendant Leoda Dunham 
acted rationally in conveying a remainder interest in her un-
divided one-half of the subject property, the fact that 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant Leoda Dunham reserved to herself a life estate 
is conclusive evidence that she retained the homestead. 
The assertion that a life estate may support a ~omesteaa 
has not been contested by respondents, nor should it be. 
See Arighi vs. Rule & Sons, 107 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1940). The 
obvious intent of defendant Leoda Dunham in retaining a life 
estate was to assure her a place to live for the rest of her 
life. Such assurance would certainly be lost had she conveyed 1 
her homestead because her life estate would then be subject 
to appellant's judgment. 
In addition to the foregoing, which demonstrates from 
a factual standpoint that defendant Leoda Dunham did not convey 
her homestead, this court should hold as a matter of law 
that the reservation of any interest in homestead property 
which is capable of supporting a homestead, amounts to a 
reservation of the homestead unless the deed of conveyanc.e 
specifically provides that the homestead is to be conveyed. 
Such a holding would follow the California rule as expressed 
in Arighi relative to the abandonment of a homestead. 
Further, it would meet the liberal construction requirement 
of In re Mower's estate, 73 P .2d 967 lUtah 1939), by 
preventing a homestead claimant from unwittingly subjecting 
a retained interest to creditors' claims. Also, it would aid 
judgment creditors in that they would not be forced to guess 
or begin lawsuits to determine what property is subject to the!'. 
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claims. Thus, the public welfare could be served by establishing 
a precedent which requires a homestead claimant to specifically 
convey a homestead interest where such claimant retains an 
interest in the property sufficient to support a homestead. 
III 
THE Q)URT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD THAT THE VALUE 
OF THE INTEREST CONVEYED 'ID RESPONDENTS BY 
DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM WAS LESS THAN THE 
VALUE OF DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM'S HOMESTEAD WHEN 
SUCH VALUE WAS IN QUESTION AND CONSTITUTED A 
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT. 
In the event this court for any reason upholds the 
lower court's ruling that respondents received the homestead 
interest of defendant Leoda Dunham free and clear of appellant's 
judgment lien, then appellant submits the following argument. 
Though the judgment appealed from is designated "Judgment 
On The Pleadings", it is nore correctly a Sununary Judgment in 
that the court did not exclude the respondents' affidavits which 
were submitted with respondents' Motion For Judgment On The 
Pleadings Or For Surrunary Judgment. Rule 12(c), U.R.C.P. 
In In re Williams Estate, 348 P.2d 683 (_Utah 1960), 
the court said the following regarding the propriety of summary 
judgment: 
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"Summary Judgment is proper only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
admissions show that there is no genuine 
issue of ffi3.terial fact and that the noving 
party is entitled to a Judgment as a natter 
of law •••. " Page 685. (Emphasis added. ) 
Also, in~, supra., the court gave additional 
guidance as follows: 
" To sustain a sumrnary judgment, the 
pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences 
therefrom, viewed m::ist favorably to the loser, 
must show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and that the winner is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. Such showing 
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable 
p:>ssibility that the loser could win if given a 
trial". Page 268. (Emphasis added.) 
Further, in Singleton vs. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 lUtah 
19.67) , the court said: 
'' It will be noted that a sumrnary judgment 
can be granted only when it is shown that there 
is no geniune issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party also is entitled to judgment 
as a ffi3.tter of law under those facts. The court 
cannot ronsider the weight of testimony or the 
credibility of witnesses in considering a 
motion for sumrnary judgment. He simply determines 
that there is no disputed issue of material fact 
and that as a natter of law a party should pre-
vail. "Page 12 8. (Emphasis added. 1 
The court below held that the homestead of defendant 
Leoda Dunham had been conveyed to respondents, and that the 
value of the remainder interest so conveyed was less than 
the value of eefendant Leoda Dunham's oomestead. Consequently 
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the interest passed to respondents free of appellant's judgment 
lien pursuant to U.C.A. 28-1-2 and defendant Leoda Dunham was 
left with an unprotected life estate. If the court had 
held that the conveyed property interest had a value in 
excess of the homestead amount, the appellant's judgment would 
have attached to that excess. Thus, the value of the conveyed 
interest is a naterial question, which, as explained below, is 
in dispute. 
At the hearing in the court below, respondents' counsel 
relied on defendant Leoda Dunham's self-serving declaration 
of the value of her interest in the subject property, which 
was stated in her homestead declaration to be $3,600.00. 
Other than defendant Leoda Dunham's homestead delcaration, no 
evidence was produced or referred to in the court below which 
would show that the value of defendant Leoda Dunham's remainder 
interest had a lesser value than her claimed homestead 
exemption of $4,600.00. 
The statement of the value of the subject property 
contained in the homestead declaration is incompetent 
evidence as to the true value of the property interest. 
Schuler-Knox co., supra. Thus, the court below had no 
competent evidence before it which supports its judgment 
that the property interest conveyed by defendant Leoda Dunham 
to respondents had a lesser value than her homestead exemption. 
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At the hearing below, appellant's counsel claimed the 
interest was worth approximately $15, 000. 00, and referred to 
the purchase agreement between respondents and defendant 
Leoda Dunham wherein respondents obtained the remainder 
interest by agreeing to pay approximately $2 ,000. 00 to obtain 
a release of rcortgage against the property and to acquire 
appellant's interest in the property. See Agreement attached 
to either respondents' Affidavit which was filed with responden:s~ 
Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or For Summary Judgment. 
Appellant's interest in defendant Leoda Dunham's property was 
a judgment of $11,574.43, together with interest of $1,388.00 
as of the time of the conveyance. Further, the conveyance to 
respondents took place less than three months after the 
home stead declaration of defendant Leoda Dunham was made. The 
fact that respondents offerred to purchase defendant Leoda 
Dunham's interest, subject to her life estate, in return for 
a promise to acquire appellant's interest in the property 
and to pay off the $2, 000. 00 rcortgage, together with the fact ! 
that this consideration of approximately $15,000.00 was 
offered only three months after defendant Leoda Dunham claimed 1 
the interest in the property was worth $3,600.00, should 
have been sufficient by itself to cause the court below to 
question the validity of defendant Leoda Dunham's own claim 
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as to the value of her interest in the subject real estate. 
This is especially true in that defendant Leoda Dunham 
made her homestead declaration only three days before the 
subject property was to be sold at sheriff's sale. 
In hearings before the District Court, respondents claimed 
that the Agreement provided only that respondents would be 
obligated to acquire the appellant's undivided one-half interest 
in the property. They argued that the agreement did not require 
them to satisfy appellant's judgment. If they had, they would 
have admitted that they were willing to pay off the $2,000. 00 
rrortgage and the appellant's judgment in the approximate amount 
of $13, 000. 00 to obtain a remainder interest in defendant 
Leoda Dunham's lll'ldivided one-half. Thus they would have admitted 
that they paid consideration worth approximately $15,000,00 for 
an interest which defendant Leoda Dunham had declared to be 
worth no rrore than $3,600.00 only three rronths before. 
The terms of the agreement clearly show what was intended. 
Paragraph 3 of the Agreement provides that the respondents herein 
were to "acquire" appellant's interest in the subject property 
so as to give defendant Leoda Dunham "the full use, control, 
income and possession" of the property for her life. See 
Agreement attached to either respondents' affidavit which was filed 
with respondents' Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or For 
Summary Judgment. The only way that defendant Leoda Dunham 
could obtain the full use and control of the subject property, 
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assuming respondents' claim that the homestead was conveyed 
to them is correct, was by satisfying appellant's judgment. 
If they failed to satisfy the judgment, defendant Leoda 
Dunham's life estate would be in continual jeopardy. Thus, 
part of the consideration paid defendant Leoda Dunham must 
have been the promise to satisfy appellant's judgment lien, 
and, consequently, respondents agreed to provide defendant 
Leoda Dunham with a consideration which was greatly in excess 
of the claimed value of $3,600.00, 
The court below, rather than recognize the dispute over 
the value of the subject real estate interest, chose to accept 
the value based on defendant Leoda Dunham's homestead declarati~ 
The homestead declaration claimed defendant Leoda Dunham's I' 
interest to be worth $J, 600. 00. The District Court apparently 
1 
overlooked the self-serving and incompetent nature of the 
homestead declaration. The homestead declaration was clearly 
self-serving in that it was filed two days before the subject 
realty was to be sold at sheriff's sale. The obvious purpose 
of filing the declaration was to interfere with the sheriff's 
sale of the property. Within thre.e months of the date the 
homestead declaration was filed, the property was conveyed to 
respondents upon the terms of the Agreement referred to above. 
Clearly, the value of property set forth in a homestead 
declaration, under these circumstances, should not be accepted 
as conclusive for purposes of summary proceedings. 
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Further, the value of defendant Leoda Dunham's homestead was 
not squarely before the court at the hearing, and was 
certainly not established sufficiently in the pleadings for 
the court to render a judgment on the pleadings. The notion 
of appellant for Judgment On The Pleadings Or For Summary Judgment 
shows that the appellant attempted to convince the court that 
the conveyance to respondents with the reservation of a life 
estate in defendant Leoda Dunham was an act of reserving the 
homestead as well. Respondents argued that the homestead 
had been conveyed to plaintiffs. Neither party was adequately 
prepared to present evidence on the true value of the interest 
conveyed to respondents. 
Further, the court below was appraised in appellant's 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Reconsider of other evidence 
which reflects on the value of the realty in question, 
specifically the case of James L. Barker,Jr., Trustee vs. 
George R. Dunham and Leoda s. Dunham, Third Judicial District 
Court of Summit County, State of Utah, Civil No. 3085. In 
this case, judgment was rendered on September 4th, 1959, against 
defendant Leoda Dunham requiring her to account for sales of 
certain realty which was a part of the realty involved in thi~ 
matter. Defendant Leoda Dunham was to account to the plaintiffs 
in that action for one-half the value of all lots sold after 
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November 8th, 1953, and those plaintiffs were to be granted 
judgment for that amount. The records of the County Recorder 
of Summit County show that approximately four and one-half 
acres of land were conveyed by defendant Leoda Dunham out of 
the parcel in question during the period of November 8th, 
1953 to September 4th, 1959. On June 26th, 1962, the Third 
Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, 
rendered judgment against defendant Leoda Dunham in the 
amount of $4,200. 00, which amount represents one-half the 
proceeds of the sale of the approximately four and one-half 
acres referred to above. 
The realty in question in this suit consists of an un-
divided one-half interest in approximately thirty five l35 J 
acres of hillside land, certain unsold lots in Kamp Kill Kare 
subdivision, and approximately 6. 5 acres of land which is 
I 
similar to that for which the accounting was required of de fen· i 
dant Leoda Dunham. The value of the 6.5 acres alone should, 
consequently, be equal to or greater than the value of the 
approximately four and one-half acres for which defendant 
Leoda Dunham accounted. Since one-half of the value of four 
and one-half acres from 1953 to 1959 was $4,200.00, the value 
of the 6. 5 similar acres certainly must have been greater in 
1972 when respondents purchased a one-half interest in the 
6.5 acres as well as 35 hillside acres and unsold lots in Kamp 
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·I 
Kill Kare subdivision. Thus, evidence can be produced and should 
be produced relative to the value of the interest conveyed 
to respondents by defendant Leoda Dunham in 1972. This evidence 
will show that the true value of the realty interest in question 
is greatly in excess of $3,600.00 as claimed by defendant Leoda 
Dunham in her homestead declaration. 
The principles of law referred to above regarding summary 
judgment, as applied to this case, result in the conclusion 
that summary judgment on the value of the remainder interest 
conveyed to respcndents was improper. The court below necessarily 
had to view t.'1e facts in the most favorable light to appellant. 
Dunn, supra. Also, it should not have judged the weight of 
the evidence, but rather determined whether conflicting evidence 
existed. Singleton, supra. The agreement, referred to above, 
by which respondents agreed to purchase defendant Leoda Dunham's 
remainder interest, when viewed in the no st favorable light 
for appellants, demonstrates that respondents obligated themselves 
to pay approximately $15,000.00 for the properties. Further, the 
court below should not have judged the credibility of the pur-
chase agreement against that of the homestead declaration which 
showed defendant Leoda Dunham's entire interest to be worth 
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only $3,600.00. Instead, the lower court should have recognize 
the incompetency of the stated value in the homestead declarat11 
and ruled that the determination of the value of the subject 
property must await trial. 
IV 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED 
TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN 
THE PARTIES 1 PLEADINGS WHICH WERE ADMITTED. 
Many of the allegations in the parties' pleadings were 
admitted. Sl.Ullinary procedures were begun in the case because 
! 
of these admissions. However, the Findings Of Fact as presente:I 
I 
by the respondents and approved by the court did not reflect 
many of the admissions. These admissions are material and 
present a clear picture of the facts in this case. Appellant's 
motion to amend the Findings Of Fact to include these admission:! 
should aa ve been gr anted. 
v 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 5 SHOULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED 
TO AVOID THE REPRESENTATION THAT THE APPELLANT 
FILED NOTHING NHICH INDICATED THE VALUE OF THE 
LAND IN QUESTION, IN THAT SUCH FINDING OF FACT 
IS MISLEADING BECAUSE INSOFAR AS THE VALUE OF 
THE IAND WAS DISCUSSED, APPELLANT RELIED ON 
THOSE CERTAIN AFFIDAVITS FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS 
WHICH SET FORTH THE CONSIDERATION THE RESPONDENTS 
WERE WILLING TO PAY TO DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM TO 
OBTAIN HER INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY OF 
THIS IAWSUIT. 
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Finding of Fact No. 5 implies that appellant failed 
to make the court below aware of any evidence showing a value 
different than that claimed by C'efendant Leoda Dunham in her 
homestead C'eclaration. As explained above, appellant relied 
on the Agreement submitted by respondents with their affidavit 
in support of their Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or 
For Surmnary Judgment to show what respondents were willing to 
pay for the property. Consequently, Finding of Fact No. 5 
should have been amended to remove the false implication given 
therein. 
VI 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 7 SHOULD BE AMENDED TO 
EXPLICITLY STATE THAT DUE TO THE CONVEYANCE BY 
DEFENDANT' ;LEODA DUNHAM OF HER HOMESTEAD INTEREST 
TO THE RESPONDENTS, SHE RETAINED A BARE LIFE 
ESTATE vlHICH WAS SOLD AT THE SHERIFF'S SALE OF 
DECEMBER 7th, 1976, WHICH STATEMENT WILL REMOVE 
THE AMBIGUITY CAUSED BY REFERENCE TO "EXISTING 
INTEREST" FOUND IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF FINDING 
NO. 7. 
The court below held .that defendant Leoda Dunham 
had conveyed her homestead to respondents, and that the value 
of the interest conveyed to respondents was less than the 
total homestead exemption defendant Leoda Dunham was entitled 
to. Thus, based upon this ruling, and U.C.A. 28-1-2, the 
respondents' interest in the property could not have been 
sold at the sheriff's sale of December 7th, 1976. 
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I 
Finding of Fact No. 7 states that "the then existing interj 
was sold at the sheriff's sale. 
whose interest is referred to. 
The finding does not 
However, in context, 
indicate , 
the re- I 
ference can only be to the retained life estate of defendant i 
i 
Leoda Dunham, for, under the lower court's ruling, this is thel 
only interest that could be sold at the sheriff's sale. Thus, 
the finding should have been amended so as to directly set fort' 
the consequence of the court's ruling, i.e., that the unpro-
tected life estate of defendant Leoda Dunham was sold at 
the sheriff's sale. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues herein considered which are of rrost importance 
concern t.11.e status of a home stead where a judgment has created 
a lien against the property prior to the time that the declara·I 
tion of homestead is made and filed. It is appellant's posi-
tion that a judgment lien existing prior to the date that 
a homestead declaration is made is superior to that homestead 
and, consequently, a declaration of homestead protects only 
against judgment liens obtained during the time that such home·I 
stead exists. It is also appellant's contention, which in this! 
• I 
case may be seen to be in the alternative, that the act of a 
I 
homestead claimant in reserving any interest capable of supportj 
a homestead, when the remaining interest of the homestead 
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claimant is conveyed away without specifically conveying the 
homestead, is, as a rna.tter of law, a reservation of the homestead 
claim as wel 1. In any event, the court below was not justified 
in holding in summary proceedings that the value of the property 
conveyed to respondents herein was in value less than the total 
homestead exemption of defendant Leoda Dunham. The question 
of value is rna.terial and is disputed herein, and, based upon such 
facts, the question of value should be properly determined 
at trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
-1~~ I hereby certify that on this..¢...LL..day of December, 1977 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief to Bill Thomas Peters, of Tibbals and Staten, 400 Chancellor 
Building, 220 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
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